LONDON-ZURICH TREATIES OF FEBRUARY 1959
(Constitution and Treaties entered into force August 16, 1960)
I. Memorandum Setting Out the Agreed Foundation for the Final Settlement of the Problem of Cyprus.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Greece and the Prime
Minister of the Turkish Republic. Taking note of the Declaration by the
Representative of the Greek-Cypriot Community and the Representative of
the Turkish-Cypriot Community that they accept the documents annexed to
this Memorandum as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the
problem of Cyprus. Hereby adopt, on behalf of their respective
Governments, the document annexed to this Memorandum and listed below,
as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of
List of Documents Annexed
A.- Basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus
B.- Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, The United Kingdom and Turkey.
C.- Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.
D.- Declaration made by the Government of the United Kingdom on February 17, 1959.
E.- Additional Article to be inserted in the Treaty of guarantee.
F.- Declaration made by the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers on February 17, 1959.
G.- Declaration made by the Representative of the Greek Cypriot Community on February 19, 1959.
H.- Declaration made by the Representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community on February 19, 1959.
I.- Agreed Measures to Prepare for the new arrangements in Cyprus
II. English Translation of the Document Agreed in the French Texts and Initialed by the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers at Zurich on February 11, 1959.
Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus
1. The State of Cyprus shall be a Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the vice-president Turkish elected by universal suffrage by the Greek and Turkish communities of the island respectively.
2. The official languages of the Republic of Cyprus shall be Greek and Turkish. Legislative and administrative instruments and documents shall be drawn up and promulgated in the two official languages.
3. The Republic of Cyprus shall have its own flag of neutral design and color, chosen jointly by the President and the vice-president of the Republic. Authorities and communities shall have the right to fly the Greek and Turkish flags on holidays at the same time as the flag of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish communities shall have the right to celebrate Greek and Turkish national holidays.
4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected for a period of 5 years. In the event of absence, impediment or vacancy of their posts, the President and the Vice-President shall be replaced by the President and the Vice-President of the House of Representatives respectively. In the event of vacancy in either post, the election of new incumbents shall take place within a period of not more than 45 days. The President and the Vice-President shall be invested by the House of Representatives, before which they shall take an oath of loyalty and respect for the Constitution. For this purpose, the House of Representatives shall meet within 24 hours after its constitution.
5. Executive authority shall be vested in the President and the Vice-President. For this purpose they shall have a council of Ministers composed of sever Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers. The Ministers shall appoint them by an instrument signed by them both. The Ministers may be chosen from outside the House of Representatives. Decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be taken by an absolute majority. Decisions so taken shall be promulgated immediately by the President and the Vice-President by publication in the official gazette. However, the President and the Vice-President shall have the right of final veto and the right to return the decision of the Council of Ministers under the same conditions as those laid down for laws and decisions of the House of Representatives.
6. Legislative authority shall be vested in a House of Representatives elected for a period of 5 years by universal suffrage of each community separately in the proportion of 70 per cent for the Greek community and 30 per cent for the Turkish community, this proportion being fixed independently of statistical data. The House of Representatives shall exercise authority in all matters other than those expressly reserved to the Communal Chambers. In the event of a conflict of authority, such conflict shall be decided by the Supreme Constitutional Court that shall be composed of one Greek, one Turk, and one neutral, appointed jointly by the President and the Vice-President. The neutral judge shall be president on the Court.
7. Laws and decisions of the House of Representatives shall be adopted by a simple majority of the members present. They shall be promulgated within 15 days if neither the President nor the Vice-President returns them for reconsideration as provided in Point 9 below. The constitutional Law, with the exception of its basic articles, may be modified by a majority comprising two-thirds of the Greek members and two-thirds of the Turkish members of the House of Representatives. Any modification of the electoral law and the adoption of any law relating to the municipalities and of any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple majority of the Greek and Turkish members of the House of Representatives taking part in the vote and considered separately. On the adoption of the Budget, the President and the Vice-President may exercise their right to return it to the House of Representatives, if in their judgment any question of discrimination arises. If the House maintains its decisions, the President and the Vice-President shall have the right of appeal to the Supreme Constitutional Court.
8. The President and the Vice-President, separately and conjointly, shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organizations and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate or concerning defense and security.
9. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall have, separately and conjointly, the right to return all laws and decisions, which may be returned to the House of Representatives within a period of not more than 15 days for reconsideration. The House of Representatives shall pronounce within 15 days on any matter so returned. If the House of Representatives maintains its decisions, the President and the Vice-President shall promulgate the law or decision in question within the time-limits fixed for the promulgation of laws and decisions. Laws and decisions, which are considered by the President or the Vice-President to discriminate against either of the two communities, shall be submitted to the Supreme Constitutional court which may annul or confirm the law or decision, or return it to the House of Representatives for reconsideration, in whole or in part. The law or decision shall become effective until the Supreme Constitutional Court or, where it has been returned the House of Representatives has taken a decision on it.
10. Each community shall have its Communal Chamber composed of a number of representatives which it shall itself determine. The Communal Chambers shall have the right to impose taxes and levies on members of their community to provide for their needs and for the needs of bodies and institutions under their supervision. The Communal Chambers shall exercise authority in all religious, educational, cultural and teaching questions, and questions of personal status. They shall exercise authority in questions where the interests and institutions are of a purely communal nature, such as sporting and charitable foundations, bodies and associations, producers and consumers, co-operatives and credit establishments, created for the purpose of promoting the welfare of one of the communities. These producers and consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments, which shall be administered under the laws of the Republic, shall be subject to the supervision of the Communal Chambers. The Communal Chambers shall also exercise authority in matters initiated by municipalities which are composed of one community only. These municipalities, to which the laws of the Republic shall apply, shall be supervised in their functions by the Communal Chambers. Where the central administration is obliged to take over the supervision of the institutions, establishments, or municipalities mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs by virtue of legislation in force, this supervision shall be exercised by officials belonging to the same community as the institution, establishment, or municipality in question.
11. The Civil Service shall be composed as to 70 per cent of Greeks and as to 30 per cent of Turks. It is understood that this quantitative division will be applied as far as practicable in all grades of the Civil Service. In regions or localities where one of the two communities is in a majority approaching 100 per cent, the organs of the local administration shall be composed solely of officials belonging to that community.
12. The deputies of the Attorney-General of the Republic, the inspector-General, the Treasurer and the Governor of the issuing Bank may not belong to the same community as their principals. The holders of these posts shall be appointed by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting in agreement.
13. The heads and deputy heads of the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie and the Police shall be appointed by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting in agreement. One of these heads shall be Turkish and where the head belongs to one of the communities, the deputy head shall belong to the other.
14. Compulsory military service may only be instituted with the agreement of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus shall have an army of 2,000 persons, of when 60 per cent shall be Greek and 40 per cent Turkish. The security forces (gendarmerie and police) shall have a complement of 2,000 persons, which may be reduced or increased with the agreement of both the President and the Vice-President. The security forces shall be composed as to 70 per cent of Greeks and as to 30 per cent of Turks. However, for an initial period this percentage may be raised to a maximum of 40 per cent of Turks (and consequently reduced to 60 per cent of Greeks) in order not to discharge those Turks now serving in the police, apart from the auxiliary police.
15. Forces, which are stationed in parts of the territory of the Republic inhabited, in a proportion approaching 100 per cent, by members of a single community, shall belong to that community.
16. A High Court of Justice shall be established, which shall consist of two Greeks, one Turk and one neutral, nominated jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. The President of Court shall be neutral judge, who shall have tow votes. This Court shall constitute the highest organ of the judicature (appointments, promotions of judges, etc.).
17. Civil disputes, where the plaintiff and the defendant belong to the same community, shall be tried by a tribunal composed of judges belonging to that community. If the plaintiff and defendant belong to different communities, the composition and status of these tribunals shall be determined according to the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber and they shall apply the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber. In criminal cases, the tribunal shall consist of judges belonging to the same community of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court of Justice.
18. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall each have the right to exercise the prerogative of mercy to persons from their respective communities who are condemned to death. In cases where the plaintiffs and the convicted persons are members of different communities the prerogative of mercy shall be exercised by agreement between the President and the Vice-President. In the event of disagreement the vote for clemency shall prevail. When mercy is accorded the penalty shall be commuted to life imprisonment.
19. In the event of agricultural reform, lands shall redistributed only to persons who are members of the same community as the expropriated owners. Expropriations by the State or the Municipalities shall only be carried out on payment of a just and equitable indemnity fixed, in disputed cases, by the tribunals. In appeal to the tribunals shall have the effect of suspending action. Expropriated property shall only be used for the purpose for which the expropriation was made. Otherwise the property shall be restored to the owners.
20. Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of Cyprus by the Turkish inhabitants of these towns. However: a. In each of the towns a coordinating body shall be set up which shall supervise work which needs to be carried out jointly and shall concern itself with matters which require a degree of co-operation. These bodies shall each be composed of two members chosen by the Turkish municipalities and a president chosen by agreement between the two municipalities. b. The President and the Vice-President shall examine within 4 years the question whether or not this separation of municipalities in the five largest towns shall continue. With regard to the localities, special arrangements shall be made for the constitution of municipal bodies, following, as far as possible, the rule of proportional representation for the two communities.
21. A treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and constitution of the new State of Cyprus shall be concluded between the republic of Cyprus, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. A treaty of military alliance shall also be concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. These two instruments shall have constitutional force. (This last paragraph shall be inserted in the Constitution as a basic article.)
22. It shall be recognized that the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other State, or a separatist independence for Cyprus (i.e. the partition of Cyprus into two independent States), shall be excluded.
23. The Republic of Cyprus shall accord most-favored-nation treatment to Great Britain, Greece and Turkey for all agreements whatever their nature. This provision shall not apply to the Treaties between the republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom concerning the bases and military facilities accorded to the United Kingdom.
24. The Greek and Turkish Governments shall have the right to subsidize institutions for education, culture, athletics and charity belonging to their respective communities. Equally, where either community considers that it has not the necessary number of schoolmasters, professors, or priests for the working of its institutions, the Greek and Turkish Governments may provide them to the extent strictly necessary to meet their needs.
25. One of the following Ministries-the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, or the Ministry of Finance-shall be entrusted to a Turk. If the President and the Vice-President agree they may replace this system by a system of rotation.
26. The new State which is to come into being with the signature of the Treaties shall be established as quickly as possible and within a period of not more than 3 months from the signature of the Treaties.
27. All the above points shall be considered to be basic articles of the Constitution of Cyprus.
The defense questions subject to veto under point 8 of the Basic Structure are as follows:
a: Composition and size of the armed forces and credits for them.
b: Appointments and promotions.
c: Imports of warlike stores and all kind of explosives.
d: Granting of bases and other facilities to allied countries.
The security questions subject to veto are as follows:
a: Appointments and promotions.
b: Allocation and stationing of forces.
c: Emergency measures and martial law.
d: Police laws. It is provided that the right of veto shall cover all emergency measures of decisions, but not those which concern the normal functioning of the police and gendarmerie.
TREATY OF GUARANTEE
The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part.
I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,
II. Desiring to go-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution. Have agreed as follows.
ARTICLE I The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution. It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with ant other State or partition of the Island.
ARTICLE II Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.
ARTICLE III The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on to-day’s date.
ARTICLE IV In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measure necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.
ARTICLE V The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia. The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
TREATY OF ALLIANCE
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, I. In their common desire to uphold peace and to preserve the security of each of them, II. Considering that their efforts for the preservation of peace and security are in conformity with the purpose and principles of the United Nations Charter. Have agreed as follow:
ARTICLE I The High Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate for their common defense and to consult together on the problems raised by that defense.
ARTICLE II The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.
ARTICLE III For the purpose of this alliance, and in order to achieve the object mentioned above, a Tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.
ARTICLE IV Greece and Turkey shall participate in the Tripartite Headquarters so established with the military contingents laid down in Additional Protocol No. I annexed to the present Treaty. The said contingents shall provide for the training of the army of the Republic of Cyprus.
ARTICLE V The Command of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation, for a period of one year each, by a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer, who shall be appointed respectively by the Governments of Greece and Turkey and by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.
ARTICLE VI The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The High Contracting Parties shall conclude additional agreements if the application of the present Treaty renders them necessary. The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible with the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in conformity with Article 102 of the United nations Charters.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL No. I.
I.The Greek and Turkish contingents which are to participate in the Tripartite Headquarters shall comprise respectively 950 Greek officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and 650 Turkish officers, non-commissioned officers and men.
II. The President and the Vise-President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in agreement, may request the Greek and Turkish Governments to increase or reduce the Greek and Turkish contingents.
III. It is agreed that the sites f the cantonments for the Greek and Turkish contingents participating in the Tripartite Headquarters, their juridical status, facilities and exemptions in respect of customs and taxes, as well other immunities and privileges and any other military and technical questions concerning the organization and operation of the Headquarters above shall be determined by a Special Convention which shall come into force not later than the Treaty of Alliance.
IV. It is likewise agreed that the Tripartite Headquarters shall be set up not later than three months after the completion of the tasks of the Mixed. Commission for the Cyprus Constitution and shall consist, in the initial period, of a limited number of officers charged with the training of the armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish contingents mentioned above will arrive in Cyprus on the date of signature of the Treaty of Alliance.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL No. II
ARTICLE I A Committee shall be set up consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Greek and Turkey, It shall constitute the supreme political body of the Tripartite Alliance and may take cognizance of any question concerning the Alliance which the Governments of the three Allied countries shall agree to submit to it.
ARTICLE II The Committee of Ministers shall meet in ordinary session by its Chairman at the request of one of the members of the Alliance. Decisions of the Committee of Ministers shall be unanimous.
ARTICLE III The Committee of Ministers shall be presided over in rotation and for a period of one year, by each of the three Foreign Ministers. It will hold its ordinary sessions, unless it is decided otherwise, in the capital of the Chairman’s country. The Chairman shall, during the year in which he holds office, preside over sessions of the Committee of Ministers, both ordinary and special. The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies whenever it shall judge it to be necessary for the fulfillment of its task.
ARTICLE IV The Tripartite Headquarters established by the Treaty of Alliance shall be responsible to the Committee of Ministers in the performance of its functions. It shall submit to it, during the Committee’s ordinary session, an annual report comprising a detailed account of the Headquarters’ activities.
TREATY OF ESTABLISHMENT
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey of the one part and the Republic of Cyprus of the other part: Desiring to make provisions to given effect to the Declaration made by the Government of the United Kingdom on the 17th of February, 1959, during the Conference at London, in accordance with the subsequent Declarations made at the Conference by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, by the Representative of the Greek Cypriot Community and by the Representative of the Greek Cypriot Community and by the Representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community; Taking note of the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee signed to-day by the Parties to this Treaty; Have agreed as follow;
ARTICLE 1 The territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall comprise the island of Cyprus, together with the islands lying off its coast, with the exception of the two areas defined in Annex A to this Treaty, which areas shall remain under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom These areas are in this Treaty and its Annexes referred to as the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area.
ARTICLE 2 (1) The Republic of Cyprus (2) The Republic of Cyprus shall co-operate fully with the United Kingdom to ensure the security and effective operation of the military bases situated in the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign base Area, and the full enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights conferred by this Treaty.
ARTICLE 3 The Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult and co-operate in the common defense of Cyprus.
ARTICLE 4 The arrangements concerning the status of forces in the Island of Cyprus shall be those contained in Annex C to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 5 The Republic of Cyprus shall secure to everyone within its jurisdiction human rights and fundamental freedoms comparable to those set out in section I of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental signed at Rome on the 4th of November, 1950, and the Protocol to that Convention signed at Paris on the 20th of March.
ARTICLE 6 The arrangements concerning the nationality of persons affected by the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus shall be those contained in Annex D to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 7 The Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom accept and undertake to carry out the necessary financial and administrative arrangements to settle question arising out of the termination of British administration in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. These arrangements are set forth in Annex E to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 8 (1) All international obligations and responsibilities of the Government of the United Kingdom shall henceforth, in so far as they may be held to have application to the Republic of Cyprus, be assumed by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. (2) The international right and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the Government of the United Kingdom in virtue of their application to the territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall henceforth be enjoyed by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
ARTICLE 9 The Parties to this Treaty accept and undertake to carry out the arrangements concerning trade, commerce and other matters set forth in Annex F to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 10 Any question or difficulty as to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty shall be settled as follows: (1) Any question or difficulty that may arise over the operation of the military requirements of the United Kingdom, or concerning the provisions of this Treaty in so far as they affect the status, rights and obligations of United Kingdom forces or any other forces associated with them under the terms of this Treaty, or of Greek, Turkish and Cypriot forces, shall be settled by negotiation between the tripartite Headquarters of the Republic of Cyprus, Greek and Turkey and the authorities of the armed forces of the United Kingdom.(2) Any question or difficulty as to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty on which agreement cannot be reached by negotiation between the military authorities in the cases described above, or, in other cases, by negotiation between the Parties concerned through the diplomatic channel, shall be composed of four representatives, one each to be nominated by the Government of the United Kingdom, the Government of Greece, the Government of Turkey and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, together with an independent chairman nominated by the President of the International Court of Justice. If the President is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or of the Republic of Cyprus of Greece or of Turkey, the Vice-President shall be requested to act; and if he also is such a citizen, the next senior Judge of the Court.
ARTICLE 11 The Annexes to this Treaty shall have force and effect as integral parts of this Treaty.
ARTICLE 12 This Treaty shall enter into force on signature by all the Parties to it.
III. Declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom
The Government of the United kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, having examined the documents concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, comprising the Basic Structure for the Republic of Cyprus, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance, drown up and approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in London from February 11,1959, and taking into account the consultations in London from 11 to 16, 1959, between the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Declare:
A. That, subject to the acceptance of their requirements as set out in Section B below, they accept the documents approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.
B. That, with the exception of two areas at
(a) Akrotiri - Episkopi - Paramali and
(b) Dhekelia - Pergamos - Ayios Nikolaos - Xylophagou, which will be retained under full British sovereignty, they are willing to transfer sovereignty over the Island of Cyprus to the Republic of Cyprus subject to the following conditions :
(1) that such rights are secured to the United Kingdom Government as are necessary to enable the two areas as aforesaid to be used effectively as military bases, including among others those rights indicated in the Annex attached, and that satisfactory Guarantees given by Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus for the integrity of the areas retained under British sovereignty and the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights referred to above ;
(2) that provision shall be made by the agreement for (i) the protection of the fundamentals human rights of the various communities in Cyprus ; (II) the protection of the interests of the members of the public services in Cyprus ; (III) determining the nationality of persons affected by the settlement ; (iv) the assumption by the Republic of Cyprus of the appropriate obligations of the present Government of Cyprus, including the settlements of claims.
C. That the Government of the United Kingdom welcome the draft Treaty of Alliance eteen the Republic of Cyprus, the Kingdom of Greece and the republic of Turkey and will co-operate with the Parties thereto in the common defense of Cyprus.
D. That the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus shall come into force and the formal signature of the necessary instruments by the parties concerned shall take place at the earliest practicable date and on that date sovereignty will be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus.
IV. Additional Article to be inserted in the Treaty of Guarantee
The Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus undertake to respect the integrity of the areas to be retained under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom upon the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and the enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to the United Kingdom by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom.
V. Declaration made by the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers on February 17, 1959.
The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, having considered the declaration made by the Government of United Kingdom on February 17, 1959, accept that declaration, together with the document approved by the Heads of Greek and Turkish Governments in Zurich on February 11, 1959, as providing the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.
E. Averoff-Tossizza _Fatin R. Zorlu
VI. Declaration Made by the Representative of the Greek-Cypriot Community on February 19, 1959 Archbishop Makarios, representing the Greek Cypriot community, having examined the documents concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus drawn up approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on February 11, 1959, and the declarations made by the Government of the United Kingdom and by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey on February 17, 1959, declares that he accepts the documents and the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.
VII. Declaration Made by the Representative of the Turkish-Cypriot Community on February 19, 1959
Dr. Kutchuk, representing the Turkish Cypriot Community having examined the documents concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus drawn up and approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on February 11, 1959, and the declarations made by the Government of the United Kingdom and by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey on February 17, 1959, declares that he accepts the documents and declarations as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.
VIII. Agreed Measures to Prepare for the New Arrangements in Cyprus.
1. All parties to the Conference firmly endorse the aim of bringing the constitution (including the elections of President, Vice-President, and the three Assemblies) and the Treaties into full effect as soon as practicable and in any case not later than twelve months from today’ s date (the 19th of February, 1959). Measures leading to the transfer of sovereignty in Cyprus will begin at once.
2. The first of these measures will be the immediate establishment of:
a. a joint Commission in Cyprus with the duty of completing a draft constitution for the independent Republic of Cyprus, incorporating the basic structure agreed at the Zurich Conference. This commission shall be composed of one representative each of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot community and one representative nominated by the Government of Greece and one representative nominated by the representative of Turkey, together with a legal adviser nominated by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, and shall in its work have regard to and shall scrupulously observe the points contained in the documents of the Zurich Conference and shall fulfill its task in accordance with the principles there laid down:
b. a Transitional Committee in Cyprus, with responsibility for drawing up plans for adopting and reorganizing the Governmental machinery in Cyprus in preparation for the transfer of authority to the independent Republic of Cyprus. This committee shall be composed of the Governor of Cyprus, the leading representative of the Turkish community and other Greek and Turkish Cypriots nominated by the Governor after consultation with the two leading representatives in such a way as not to conflict with paragraph 5 of the Basic structure:
c. a joint Committee in London composed of a representative of each of the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and one representative each of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, with the duty of preparing the final treaties giving effect to the conclusions of the London Conference. This Committee will prepare drafts for submission to Governments covering inter ail matters arising from the retention of areas in Cyprus under British sovereignty, the provision to the United Kingdom Government of certain ancillary rights and facilities in the independent Republic of Cyprus, questions of nationality, the treatment of the liabilities of the present Government of Cyprus, and the financial and economic problems arising from the creation of an independent Republic of Cyprus.
3. The Governor will, after consultation with the two leading representatives, invite individual members of the Transitional Committee to assume special responsibilities for particular departments and functions of Government. This process will be started as soon as possible and will be progressively extended.
4. The headquarters mentioned in Article 4 of the Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey will be established three months after the completion of the work of the Commission referred to in paragraph 2a above and will be composed of a restricted number of officers who will immediately undertake the training of the armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus on the date when the sovereignty will be transferred to the Republic.
MAKARIOS’ “13 POINTS”
Amendments to the 1960 Cyprus Constitution proposed by Archbishop Makarios on 30 November 1963.
1. The right of veto of the President and Vice-President to be abandoned.
2. The vice-President of the Republic to Desputise for the President in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to reform his duties.
3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and its Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not, as at present, the president by the Greek members of the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish members of the House.
4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for the President of the House of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
5. The Constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.
6. Unified municipalities to be established.
7. The administration of justice to be unified.
8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished.
9. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and the Defense Forces to be determined by a law.
10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Service and the Forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
11. The number of members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to five.
12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.
13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished.
LETTER OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO PRIME MINISTER İNÖNÜ AND İNÖNÜ’S REPLY
Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister Ýnönü, June 1964, as released by the White House, January 15, 1966.
White House Statement
At the request of the Government of Turkey, the White House is today releasing the texts of letters exchanged on June 5, 1964, between President Johnson and the then Prime Minister of Turkey İsmet İnönü on the Cyprus crisis. Steps subsequent to this exchange of letters led to the visit of Prime Minister İnönü to Washington later in that month and constructive discussions by the President and the Prime Minister of the issues involved. A joint communique released at the conclusion of those discussions welcomed the opportunity for a full exchange of views by the two leaders and the occasion to consider ways in which the two countries could strengthen the efforts of the United Nations with respect to the safety and security of Cyprus. The communique noted that “the cordial and candid conversations of the two leaders strengthened the broad understanding already existing between Turkey and the United States.” The United States continues to value highly the close and friendly relations we maintain with Turkey.
President Johnson’s Letter to Prime Minister İnönü, June 5, 1964.
Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through Ambassador Hare from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far-reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your Government to consult fully in advance with us. Ambassador Hare has indicated that you have postponed your decision for a few hours in order to obtain my views. I put to you personally whether you really believe that it is appropriate for your Government, in effect, to present a unilateral decision of such consequence to an ally who has demonstrated such staunch support over the years as has the United States for Turkey. I must, therefore, first urge you to accept the responsibility for complete consultation with the United States before any such action is taken. It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I must call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of effecting a form of partition of the Island, a solution which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. Further, that the Treaty requires consultation among the Guarantor Powers. It is the view of the United States that the possibility of such consultation have by no means been exhausted in this situation and that, therefore, the reservation of the right to take unilateral action is not yet applicable. I must call your attention, also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Rusk declared at the recent meeting of the Ministerial Council of NATO in The Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as “literally unthinkable.” Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; nothing less can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies. Further, Mr. Prime Minister, I am concerned about the obligations of Turkey as a member of the United Nations. The United Nations has provided forces on the island to keep the peace. Their task has been difficult but, during the past several weeks, they have been progressively successful in reducing the incidents of violence on that Island. The United Nations Mediator has not yet completed his work. I have no doubt that the general membership of the United Nations would react in the strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey which would defy the efforts of the United Nations and destroy any prospect that the United Nations could assist in obtaining a reasonable and peaceful settlement of this difficult problem. I wish also, Mr. Prime Minster, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your Government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your Government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances. Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel obligated to call to your attention in the most friendly fashion the fact that such a Turkish move could lead to the slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots on the Island of Cyprus. Such an action on your part would unleash the furies and there is no way by which military action on your part could be sufficient effective to prevent wholesale destruction of many of those whom you are trying to protect. The presence of United Nations forces could not prevent such a catastrophe. You may consider that what I have said is much too severe and that we are disregardful of Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation. I should like to assure you that this is not the case. We have exerted ourselves both publicly and privately to assure the safety of Turkish Cypriots and to insist that a final solution of the Cyprus problem should rest upon the consent of the parties most directly concerned. It is possible that you feel in Ankara that the United States has not been sufficiently active in your behalf. But surely you know that our policy has caused the liveliest resentments in Athens (where demonstrations have been aimed against us) and has led to a basic alienation between the United States and Archbishop Makarios. As I said to your Foreign Minister in our conversation just a few weeks ago, we value very highly our relations with Turkey. We have considered you as a great ally with fundamental common interests. Your security and prosperity have been a deep concern of the American People and we have expressed that concern in the most practical terms. You and we have fought together to resist the ambitions of the Communist world revolution. This solidarity has meant a great deal to us and I would hope that it means a great deal to your Government and to your people. We have no intention of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the Turkish Cypriot community. We have not been able to find a final solution because this is, admittedly, one of the most complex problems on earth. But I wish to assure you that we have been deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriots and will remain so. Finally, Mr. Prime Minister I must tell you that you have posed the gravest of issues of war and peace. These are issues which go far beyond the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States. They not only will certainly involve war between Turkey and Greece but could involve wider hostilities because of the unpredictable consequences which a unilateral intervention in Cyprus could produce. You have your responsibilities as Chief of the Government of Turkey; I also have mine as President of the United States. I must, therefore, inform you in the deepest friendship that unless I can have your assurance that you will not take such action without further and fullest consultation I cannot accept your injunction to Ambassador Hare of secretary and must immediately ask for emergency meetings of the NATO Council and of the United Nations Security Council. I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of this situation. Unfortunately, because of the special circumstances of our present Constitutional position, I am not able to leave the United States. If you could come here for a full discussion I would welcome it. I do feel that you and I carry a very heavy responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to delay any decisions which you and your colleagues might have in mind until you and I have had the fullest and frankest consultation.
Lyndon B. Johnson
İnönü’s Response to the President, June 13, 1964.
Dear Mr. President,
I have received your message of June 5, 1964 through Ambassador Hare. We have, upon your request, postponed our decision to exercise our right of unilateral action in Cyprus conferred to us by the Treaty of Guarantee. With due regard to the spirit of candour and friendship in which your message is meant to be written, I will, in my reply, try also to explain to you in full frankness my views about the situation.
Your message, both in wording and content, has been disappointing for an ally like Turkey who has always been giving the most serious attention to its relations of alliance with the United States and has brought to the fore substantial divergence of opinion in various fundamental matters pertaining to these relations. It is my sincere hope that both these divergence and the general tone of your message are due to the haste in which a representation made in good-will was, under pressure of time, based on data hurriedly collected. In the first place, it is being emphasized in your message that we have failed to consult with the United States when a military intervention in Cyprus was deemed indispensable by virtue of the Treaty of Guarantee. The necessity of a military intervention in Cyprus has been felt four times since the closing days of 1963. From the outset we have taken a special care to consult the United States on this matter. Soon after the outbreak of the crisis, on December 25, 1963, we have immediately informed the United States of our contacts with the other guaranteeing powers only to be answered that the United States was no a party to this issue. We then negotiated with the United Kingdom and Greece for intervention and, as you know, a tri-partite military administration under British command was set-up on December 26, 1993. Upon the failure of the London conference and the joint Anglo-American proposals, due to the attitude of Makarios and in the face of continuing assaults in the island against the Turkish Cypriots, we lived through very critical days in February and taking advantage of the visit of Mr. George Ball to Ankara, we informed again the United States of the gravity of the situation. We tried to explain to you that the necessity of intervention to restore order in the island might arise in view of the vacuum caused by the rejection of the Anglo-American proposals and we informed you that we might have to intervene at any time. We even requested guarantees from you on specific issues and your answers were in the affirmative. However you asked us not to intervene and assured us that Makarios would get at the United Nations a severe lesson while all the Turkish rights and interests would be preserved. We complied with your request without any satisfactory result being secured at the United Nations. Moreover the creation of the United Nations force, decided upon by the Security Council, became a problem. The necessity for intervention was felt for the third time to protect the Turkish Community against the assaults of the terrorist in Cyprus who were encouraged by the doubts as to whether the United Nations forces would be set up immediately after the adoption of the Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964. But assuring us that the force would be set up very shortly, you insisted against that we refrain from intervening. Thereupon we postponed our intervention once again, awaiting the United Nations forces to assume their duty.
Dear Mr. President,
The era of terror in Cyprus has a particular character which rendered ineffective all measures taken so far. From the very onset, the negotiations held to restore security and the temporary setups have all helped only to increase the aggressiveness and the destructiveness of the Makarios administration. The Greek Cypriots have lately started to arm themselves overtly and considered the United Nations as an additional instrument to backup their ruthless and unconstitutional rule. It has become quite obvious that the United Nations have neither the authority nor the intent to intervene for the restoration of constitutional order and to put an end to aggression. You are well aware of the instigative attitude of the Greek Government towards the Greek Cypriots. During the talks held in your office, in the United States, we informed you that under the circumstances we would eventually be compelled to intervene in order to put an end to the atrocities in Cyprus. We also asked your secretary of State at The Hague whether the United States would support us in such an eventuality and we received no answer. I think I have thus reminded you how many times and under what circumstances we informed you of the necessity for intervention in Cyprus. I do remember having Emphasized to your high level officials our due appreciation of the special responsibilities incumbent upon the United States within the alliance and of the necessity to be particularly careful and helpful to enable her to maintain solidarity within the alliance. As you see, we never had the intention to confront you with a unilateral decision on our part. Our grievance stems from our inability to explain to you a problem which caused us for moths utmost distress and from your refusal to take a frank and firm stand on the issue as to which party is on the right side in the dispute between two allies, namely, Turkey and Greece.
In your message you further emphasize the obligation of Turkey, under the provisions of the Treaty, to consult with the other two guaranteeing powers, before taking any unilateral action. Turkey is fully aware of this obligation. For the past six months we have indeed complied with the requirements of this obligation. But Greece has not only thwarted all the attempts made by Turkey to seek jointly the ways and means to stop Greek Cypriots from repudiating international treaties, but has also supported their unlawful and inhuman acts and has even encouraged them. The Greek Government itself has not hesitated to declare publicly that the international agreements it signed with us were no longer in force. Various examples to that effect were, in due course, communicated in detail, orally and in writing, to your State Department. We likewise fulfilled our obligation of constant consultation with the Government of the United Kingdom, the other guaranteeing power. In several instances we have, jointly with the Government of the United Kingdom, made representations to the Greek Cypriots with a view to restoring constitutional order. But unfortunately, these representations were of no avail due to the negative attitude of the Greek Cypriot authorities. As you see Turkey has earnestly explored every avenue of consulting continuously and acting jointly with the other two guaranteeing powers. This being the fact, it can not be asserted that Turkey has failed to abide by her obligation of consulting with the other two guaranteeing powers before taking unilateral action. I put it to you, Mr. President, whether the United States Government which has felt the need to draw the attention of Turkey to her obligation of consultation, yet earnestly and faithfully fulfilled by the latter, should not have reminded Greece, who repudiates treaties signed by herself, of the necessity to abide by the precept “pacta sunt servanda” which is the fundamental rule of international law. this precept which, only a fortnight ago, was most eloquently as “the basis of survival” by your Secretary of State himself in his speech at the “American Law Institute” is now being completely and contemptuously ignored by Greece, our NATO ally and by the Greek Cypriots.
Dear Mr. President,
As implied in your message, by virtue of the provisions of Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, the three guaranteeing powers have, in the event of a breach of the provisions of that Treaty, the right to take the concerted action and, if that proves impossible, unilateral action with the sole aim of re-establishing the State of affairs created by the said Treaty. The Treaty of Guarantee was signed with understanding being shared by all parties thereto. The “Gentleman’s Agreement” signed on February 19, 1959 by the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece, is an evidence of that common understanding. On the other hand, at the time of the admission of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations, the members of the organization were fully acquainted with all the international commitments and obligations of the said Republic and no objections were raised in this respect. Furthermore, in the course of discussions on Cyprus leading to the resolution adopted on March 4, 1964 by the Security Council, the United States Delegate, among others, explicitly declared that the United Nations had no power toannul or amend international treaties. The understanding expressed in your message that the intervention by Turkey in Cyprus would be for the purposes of effecting the partition of the island has caused me great surprise and profound sorrow. My surprise stems from the fact that the data furnished to you about the intentions of Turkey could be so remote from the realities repeatedly proclaimed by us. The reason of my sorrow is that our ally, the Government of the United States, could think that Turkey might lay aside the principle constituting the foundation of her foreign policy, i.e., absolute loyalty to international law, as factually evidenced in many circumstances well known to the United States. I would like to assure you the most categorically and most sincerely that if ever Turkey finds herself forced to intervene militarily in Cyprus this will be done in full conformity with the provisions and aims of international agreements. In this connection, allow me to stress, Mr. President, that the postponement of our decision does naturally, in no way affect the rights conferred to Turkey by the Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee.
Referring to NATO obligations, you state in your message that the very essence of NATO requires that allies should not wage war on each other and that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would led to a military engagement between Greek and Turkish forces. I am in full agreement with the first part of your statement, but the obligation for the NATO allies to respect international agreements concluded among themselves as well as their mutual treaty rights and commitments is an equally vital requisite of the alliance. An alliance among states which ignore their mutual contractual obligations and commitments is unthinkable. As to the concern you over the outbreak of a Turco-Greek war in case of Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus is Conformity with her rights and obligations stipulated in international agreements, I would like to stress that Turkey would undertake a “military operation” in Cyprus exclusively under the conditions and for the purpose set forth in the agreements. Therefore a Turco-Greek war so properly described as “literally unthinkable” by the Honorable Dean Rusk could only occur in case of Greece’s aggression against Turkey. Our view, in case of such an intervention, is to invite to an effective collaboration, with the aim of restoring the constitutional order in Cyprus, both Greece and the United Kingdom in their capacity as guaranteeing powers. If despite this invitation and its contractual obligations Greece were to attack Turkey, we would in no way be held responsible of the consequences of such an action. I would like to hope that you have already seriously drawn the Greek Government’s attention on these matters The part of your message expressing doubts as to the obligation of the NATO allies to project in case she becomes directly involved with the USSR as a result of an action initiated in Cyprus, gives me the impression that there are as between us wide divergence of views as to the nature and basic principles of North Atlantic Alliance. I must confess that this has been to us the source of great sorrow and grave concern. Any aggression against a member of NATO will naturally call from the aggressor an effort of justification. If NATO’s structure is so weak as to give credit to the aggressor’s allegations, then it means that this defect of NATO needs really to be remedied. Our understanding is that the north Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The only point left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and the scale of this assistance. If NATO should start discussing the right and the wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist the member should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning. An obligation of assistance, if it is to carry any weight, should come into being immediately upon the observance of aggression. That is why Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty considers an attack against one of the member states an attack against them all and makes it imperative for them to assist the party so attacked by taking the forthwith such an action as they deem necessary. In this connection I would like to further point out that the agreements on Cyprus have met with the approval of the North Atlantic Council, as early as the stage of the United Nations debate on the problem, i.e., even prior to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, hence long before the occurrence of the events of December 1963. As you will recall, at the meeting of NATO Ministerial Council held three weeks ago at the Hague, it was acknowledged that the treaties continued to be the basis for legality as regards the situation in the island and the status of Cyprus. The fact that these agreements have been violated as a result of the fragrantly unlawful act of one of the parties of the island should in no way mean that the said agreements are no longer in force and that the rights and obligations of Turkey by virtue of those agreements should be ignored. Such an understanding would mean that as long as no difficulties arise, the agreements are considered as valid and they are no longer in force when difficulties occur. I am sure you will agree with me that such an understanding of law cannot be accepted. I am equally convinced that there could be no shadow of doubt about the obligation to protect Turkey within the NATO Alliance in situation that can, by no means, be attributed to an arbitrary act of Turkey. An opposite way of thinking would lead to the repudiation and denial of the concept of law and of Article 5 of the United Nations Charter. In your message, concern has been expressed about the commitments of Turkey as a member of the United Nations. I am sure, Mr. President, you will agree with me if I say that such a concern, which I do not share, is groundless especially for the following reasons : Turkey has distinguished herself as one of the most loyal members of the United Nations ever since its foundation. The Turkish people spared no effort to safeguard the principles of the United Nations Charter, and has even sacrificed her sons for this cause. Turkey has never failed in supporting this organization and, in order to secure its functioning, has borne great moral and material sacrifices even when she had most pressing financial difficulties. Despite the explicit rights conferred to Turkey by the Treaty of Guarantee, my Government’s respect for and adherence to the United Nations have recently been demonstrated once more by its acceptance of the Security Council resolution of March 4,1964 as well as by the priority it has given to the said resolution. Should the United Nations have been progressively successful in carrying out their task as pointed out in your message, a situation which is of such grave concern for both you and I, would never have arisen. It is a fact that the United Nations operations in the island have proved unable to put an end to the oppression. The relative calm which has apparently prevailed in the island for the past few weeks marks the beginning of preparations of the Greek Cypriots for further tyranny. Villages are still under siege. The United Nations Forces, assuaging Turkish Cypriots, enable the Greeks to gather their croops ; but they do not try to stop the Greeks when the croops of the Turks are at stake and they act as mere spectators to Greek assaults. These vitally important details may not well reach you, whereas we live in atmosphere created by the daily reports of such tragic events. The report of Secretary-General will be submitted to the United Nations on June 15, 1964. I am seriously concerned that we may face yet another defeat similar to the one we all suffered on March 4, 1964. The session of March 4th had further convinced Makarios that the Treaty of Guarantee did not exist for him and he took the liberty of actually placing the United Nations forces under his control and direction. From then on the assassination of hostages and the besieging of villages have considerably increased.
Dear Mr. President
Our allies Who are in position to arbiter in the Cyprus issue and to orient it in the right direction have so far been unable to disentangle the problem from a substantial error. The Cyprus tragedy has been engendered by the deliberate policy of the Republic of Cyprus aimed at annulling the treaties and abrogating the constitution. Security can be established in the island only through the proper functioning of an authority above the government of Cyprus. Yet only the measures acceptable to the Cypriot government are being sought to restore security in Cyprus. The British administration set up following the December events, the Anglo-American proposals and finally the United Nations command have all been founded on this unsound basis and consequently every measure acceptable to Makarios has proved futile and has, in general, encouraged oppression and aggression.
Dear Mr. President,
You put forward in your message the resentment caused in Greece by the policy pursued by your Government. Within the content of the Cyprus issues, the nature of Greek policy and the course of action undertaken by the Greece indicate that she is apt to resort to every means within her power to secure the complete annulment of the existing treaties. We are at pains to make our allies understand the suffering we bear in our rightful cause and the irretrievable plight in which the Turkish Cypriots are living. On the other hand, it is not the character of our nation to exploit demonstrations of resentment. I assure you that our distress is deeply rooted since we can not make you understand our rightful position and convince you of the necessity of spending every effort and making use of all your authority to avert the perils inherent in the Cyprus problem by attaching to it the importance it well deserves. The France and the Germany have buried their animosity is indeed a good example. However, our nation had already given such an example forty years ago by establishing friendly relations with Greece, right after the ruthless devastation of the whole Anatolia by the armies of that country.
Dear Mr. President
As a member of the Alliance our nation is fully conscious of her duties and rights. We do not persue any aim other than the settlement of the Cyprus problem in compliance with the provisions of the existing treaties. Such a settlement is likely to be reached if you lend your support and give effect with your supreme authority to be sense of justice inherent in the character of the American nation.
I thank you for your statement emphasizing the value attached by the United States to the relations of alliance with Turkey and for your kind words about the Turkish nation. I shall be happy to come to United States to talk to Cyprus problem with you. The United Nations Security Council will meet on June the 17th. In the meantime, Mr. Dirk Stikker, Secretary General of NATO will have paid a visit to Turkey. Furthermore, the United Nations mediator Mr. Tuomioja will have submitted his result to the Secretary-General. These developments may lead to the emergence of a new situation. It will be possible for me to abroad to join you, at a date convenient for you, immediately after June 20th. It will be most helpful for me if you would let me know of any defined views and designs you may have on the Cyprus question so that I may be able to study them thoroughly before my departure for Washington. Finally, I would like to express my satisfaction for the frank, fruitfuland promising talks we had with Mr. G. Ball in Ankara just before forwarding this message to you.
Prime minister of Turkey