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History Articles Documents
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. TURKISH-U.S. RELATIONS UP TO THE EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. The history of the Turkish-American relations dates back to the early decades of the American Revolution. Americans during the Revolutionary War witnessed the tricky relations between the European countries and after gaining their independence they adopted a policy that would keep them away from the European Business. George Washington’s Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796) and Monroe Doctrine (Dec. 2, 1823) had guided American foreign policy until the late 1940s by emphasizing to maintenance of not political but commercial ties with other nations. For that reason America’s relations with the Ottoman Empire started by way of commerce. Ottoman Empire during that period was dealing with the Greek revolt and was looking for an ally outside Europe after the European Navy burnt Ottoman Navy in Navarin. This ally turned out to be America in the 1827s. During the 1830s “the U.S. Navy became deeply involved in assisting the Ottoman Navy to modernize and expand” (Henze 3). The Ottoman-American relations have three major aspects, which are commercial, cultural and military. The commercial relations as I mentioned above started in 1830s and included treaties between the two nations in 1862 and 1884. As a result of these treaties Ottoman Empire gave capitulations to U.S. citizens in Anatolia and U.S., by means of which became “the most favored nation”. Commercial relations resulted in encouraging missionaries and thus the seeds of cultural relations between the two nations were saved. Missionaries contributed to the educational and medical reforms in the Ottoman empire and due to this fact relations in the nineteenth century and even in the early 20th century remained restricted by the activities of American missionaries in the Ottoman Empire. However missionaries were not always welcomed in the Empire. Especially in the latter half of the nineteenth century, they were accused of tempting minorities. Many of them became identified with the “growing aspirations of Armenians, Bulgarians, Arabs and others” (Henze 4). Of course such attitudes began to cause friction between the two nations, i.e., America and Ottomans. Apart from commercial and cultural ties, U.S. and Ottoman Empire had a military interaction. Ottoman Empire willingly bought arms from America. The interest of the Empire in American arms was first noticed by first U.S. ambassador, David Porter, during 1830 trade agreement. By the end of the American Civil War, due to the ending of war in a shorter period than expected, Americans had an excess of guns. They needed to sell them to other nations and at that moment Ottoman Empire appeared as a possibility. During 1869s, Ottomans were loosing battles and minorities were causing troubles. In the Empire the blame was put on the army and Sultans tried to introduce modernization in the military. According to them a one way of modernization was to buy new arms. In the beginning, the purchased arms were war excesses but this did not last long. Immediately after consummating them Americans prepared new and modern ones. Ottoman Empire was again willing to change its old guns with the new ones. This transitional period was very fast and it contributed to the relations of the two nations in a positive way. This association continued during 1872 and 1882. During Ottoman-Russian war in 1882 some problems occurred in the military relations between the U.S. and Ottoman Empire. The entrance of the Germans into the arm selling sector contributed much to the problems which occurred between U.S. and the Ottoman Empire. Germans were siding with the Ottomans and their guns were being delivered faster than American ones. Also, at that period American missionaries were dealing with the Armenian problem and Ottomans were not pleased with that. This uneasy atmosphere between the two sides increased when U.S. decided not to sell arms to the Ottoman Empire in the Ottoman-Italian war and Turkish War of Liberation (1919-1922). These two events may be called as the first and second Arms Embargo. (Sander and Fiþek 43-45). When World War I began the Ottoman Empire sided with Central Powers. A ten year break in the diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and America occurred when America declared war on Germany. In 1917, when both sides withdrew their ambassadors without declaring war on each other, diplomatic ties had been interrupted. However Turks had never taken a hostile action against the U.S. and this situation prevented the declaration of war against them. By the end of WW1 “the fact that the United States and the Ottoman Empire had never been at war with each other complicated American participation in the post-World War I peace process” (Henze 5). When the war ended President Wilson opposed the idea of dividing Anatolia into spheres and favored an American mandate. According to the Turkish opinion, U.S. had a positive image and Turks did not want to close the door completely on the idea of an American mandate. But when “the nationalists managed to establish secure political independence,....,Turkish interest in an intimate American connection rapidly evaporated” (Harris 11). In Turkish eyes, United States was assumed as a friendly but remote power. During the Treaty of Lausanne(1923) in which the Allied Powers recognized the Turkish Republic, United States remained as an observer, but re-establishment of formal diplomatic relations remained minimal at the time. In 1927 the relationship took a relatively better turn. Except for the protest occurred during the arrival of Turkish ambassador, Ahmet Muhtar, to the United States, during these times no further friction occurred. Atatürk’s social reforms helped promote understanding of the “new nation” in the United States and American educational and cultural projects adjusted to the reforms. After Atatürk’s death Inönü succeeded him. Inönü followed Atatürk’s reforms and this made it easy for the United States to sympathize with Turkey. The strategic importance of the “newly-born republic” at the outset of the Second World War was really a danger. Turkey was no longer the world power which the ottoman Empire had once been. A sustained period of peace was necessary for Turkey to “heal her wounds” (Deringil 3). For that reason Turkey’s “active neutrality” was not welcomed by the great powers. By the end of the war Soviet leaders had begun to condemn Turkey’s “neutral posture”. WWII did not make an immediate change in the U.S. Policy towards Turkey but it did “set the stage for the intimacy of the postwar era” (Harris 12). At the end of the World War II, the image of America for the Turkish people was improved and elevated. United States was depicted as the defender of right, justice and human rights by the Turkish press. On the other hand in the eyes of Americans, Turkey was still lying in the British sphere of interest and for them Turkish neutrality was not that much important. The period that has most shaped Turkish-American relations coincides with the end of the WWII. The relationship between the two is the result of the nature of the developments between Turkey and the Soviet Union. But if one deals with the problem intensively one can easily witness that United States- Soviet Union relations was the core of the Turkish - U. S. relations in the Cold War period. When U. S - Soviet Union relations were good U.S.-Turkish relations were remote and when U.S.-Soviet Union relations were bad and there was a competition between the two, U.S.-Turkish relations were intimate. The Soviet Union, although during WWII it was destroyed by immense losses of human life, emerged from the war as an imperialistic power. The Soviets were “emboldened by their achievements in building up an impressive military might, both in conventional and nuclear weaponry, with which they felt they could challenge the other superpower, the United States, almost anywhere, anytime” (Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, Washington D.C.). The Soviets did not pay much attention to the rules of international law during the war and soon after the WWII, they refused to renew the 1925 Treaty of Friendship with Turkey. They demanded a direct say and direct involvement in the management of navigation through the Turkish Straits as well as territorial demands. These reasons required Turkey to side with the United States against a possible Soviet threat. Taking Turkey to its side well suited United States’ interests and such an understanding resulted in the formation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Truman Doctrine was contradictory to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. However Americans, who see foreign policy matters in “black-or-white terms”, constructed out a policy known as containment in order to avoid the expansion of the Soviet Union further than eastern Europe. Truman Doctrine, that is U.S. military assistance program, played an essential role in preventing Turkey from being swallowed by the Soviet Union. The relationship between Turkey and the United States in the aftermath of the WWII was not an intimate one but the Truman Doctrine made the United States, Turkey’s chief support in the Western world. At the war’s end U.S. did not feel herself responsible for the Middle East, but during 1946 Britain concluded that she could not afford the burden of protecting Greece and Turkey. The lack of power in the region might have permitted the U.S.S.R. to seize control of these two countries. So the gap was filled by U.S. and the Truman Doctrine was born. Truman Doctrine, although left some problems unresolved like the duration of the American aid, designated the “first phase of Turkey’s search for security. Under this doctrine Turkey received aid to ameliorate and modernize its military power. The Marshall Plan was not designed to deal with Turkey’s particular situation and in the beginning Turkey was not included in it as the Turks did not participate in WWII. In the Paris Conference, Turkey proved that a well organized and modern Turkey could contribute to the well being of European countries. The Marshall Plan helped the development of American economy as well. The money that they gave returned to them because it was used in buying goods from the U.S.
On May 15, 1951, Washington proposed to its NATO partners that Greece and Turkey be accepted as full members. Turkey’s adherence to the Atlantic Pact would obtain the use of Turkish air fields by the NATO allies. In 1952 Turkey was able to enter NATO officially as a “full-fledged” member. Turks greeted their adherence to NATO because they identified NATO with the United States, saw it as an extension of U.S. B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CYPRUS Cyprus is the 3rd largest island in the Mediterranean, after Sicily and Sardinia. It lies in the north-eastern corner of the East Mediterranean basin, at the meeting point of three continents- Europe, Asia and Africa, which makes it easily accessible since the earlier times. Cyprus is situated in the eastern Mediterranean south of the Anatolian peninsula about 70 kilometers off the shores of Turkey and nearly 1100 kilometers from the east cost of Greece. Beginning from the early times Cyprus has had an eventful history, because of its strategic geographic location and the richness of its copper mines. Cyprus was ruled by the Myceneans, in the 13th century B.C. At the end of the 4th century B.C. Cyprus became part of the Kingdom of Alexander the Great. Throughout the first century B.C. it became a province of the Great Roman Empire and remained as such until the 4th century A.D. Christianity was introduced during their reign by the apostles Paul, Mark and Barnabas. Then Byzantine period began and it lasted until King Richard Coeur de Lion conquered the island in the 12th century. After that, Cyprus came under the rule of the Lusignan family. Guy de Lusignan lived only two years after assuming control in 1192, but his dynasty ruled Cyprus for more than three centuries. In 1489 Cyprus became part of the Republic of Venice. During their rule feudalism was introduced and the people of the island became serfs. Turks conquered Cyprus from the Venetians in 1571, to “end the piracy on the Eastern Mediterranean trade routes and to eliminate the danger to Ottoman interests posed by the foreign possession....” (Denktash 18). The island remained as a part of Turkey for more than three centuries and during this period Turkish and Greek Cypriots were able to live side by side. Turkish villages and farms were next to Greeks. Parker T. Hart explained this situation by the “millet” system of Ottomans: “This system gave non-muslim communities autonomy under indigenous leaders and exemption from military service in return for obedience to the Sultan’s supreme authority and payment of taxes” (6-7). Also, after the conquest, Turks abolished feudalism and restored the Greek Orthodox Church to its former position. By abolishing the aristocratic order the Greek Orthodox Church became the central institution in the Greek Cypriot community. The Church was authorized to collect state taxes. On the other hand Sultans gave additional privileges to the archbishops and strengthened their power. They also ended the Latin persecution of the Greek speaking Christians and encouraged Turkish settlers to go to Cyprus and form a Turkish Cypriot community. Cyprus remained under Ottoman rule until 1878. In that year through a bilateral treaty, the Ottoman Empire allowed Great Britain to take over the administration of the island in exchange for British agreement to assist Turkey in its defense against Russia. This decision was formulated in Sultan Abdulhamid’s mind after the Ottoman-Russian war in 1876-1877. During the Berlin Conference, Britain forced Russians to give up the territories they captured and the Sultan wanted the support of Britain to continue the war. Before that the British had been offered Cyprus three times in years 1833, 1841 and 1845. However this time the situation was different. “Britain and other European powers were faced with preventing Russian expansion into areas controlled by a weakening Ottoman Empire” (Solsten 20). As a result, the expansionist policy of Tsarist Russia caused the Turks to cede Cyprus to Britain by the secret Anglo-Ottoman Cyprus Convention of June 4, 1878. According to the “Convention of Defensive Alliance” of 1878, Britain would return Cyprus when Turkey recaptured three of its eastern territories - Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, lost to Russia in the 1876-1877 war (Bölükbaşı 21). In the mood of seeing the British administration as a step toward Enosis, Greek Cypriots welcomed the rule of the British. When the British governor came to Cyprus, Greek Cypriots asked for the union of Cyprus with Greece. Thus the “seeds of future intercommunial discord were sown on the fertile soil of Cyprus” (Denktash 19). The Turkish community protested against such talks and argued that Britain should return the island to Turks if such a possibility occurs. At the outbreak of the first World War, when Turkey joined forces with Germany and its allies in 1914, Great Britain annexed the island by renouncing the 1878 Convention. Turkey recognized the British annexation, through the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. After the declaration of Cyprus as a British Crown Colony in 1925, the Turkish Cypriots were invited to choose between “repatriation” to Turkey or permanent settlement in Cyprus. During these years while Turkish Government encouraged the emigration, the British Government created difficulties in order to have a Turkish community in Cyprus against the Greek community. The British did not want to come across with a “pro-enosis Greek population with no Turkish community to oppose it” (Georghallides 44). In those years it had never been thought that one day this Turkish community would fight for the island’s destiny. In the interwar years both Turkish and Greek Governments “adopted a hands-off attitude toward Cyprus” (Bölükbaşı 22). Venizelos supposed that Britain would grant self-government to Cyprus and dreamed of attaining Enosis that way. However such an expectation did not prevent 1931 uprising in Cyprus, which aimed at a union with Greece. After that event the British imposed strict restrictions on nationalistic activities. In 1948 the British offered self-government to Cyprus, but by thinking that such an action would be a “grave” to Enosis, the Greek Orthodox Church rejected the proposal. Turks, on the other hand, were willing to accept the proposal. Also in late 1940s Turks were in favor of British sovereignty over Cyprus as they believed that “British presence on the island would function as a deterrent against Soviet expansionism in the Middle East” (Bölükbaşı 25). This state of affairs forced Greek governments to live by the Cyprus policy of Venizelos until the end of the Second World War in 1945. When the war finished the leaders of the 1931 uprising returned to Cyprus and started their activities to unite Cyprus with Greece again. C. GREEK POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS, 1950-1959. Up to 1950s Greek Governments did not support the Enosis struggle of Greek Cypriots, however they made it known that they looked favorably upon it. Another reason of Greece’s adopting a “hands-off” policy was that during those years they were dealing with political instability at home. They were not in a position to think of the unification of Cyprus with Greece. However 1950 became a significant year in the history of Cyprus. In that year Greek Orthodox Church organized a campaign for Enosis by inviting all Greek Cypriots to the churches asked them to choose between the status-qou or “enosis”. As a result Ninety-six percent of those voting preferred Enosis. Also in that year Archbishop Makarios III, who had been enthroned as the new archbishop of Cyprus, declared that he would spend all his life-time energy for Enosis. The results of the plebiscite were presented to the United Nations Secretariat in New York, however Britain pointed out that the Cyprus problem was an “internal issue and it was not subject to UN consideration” (Solsten 27). After that event Makarios threatened the Greek Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos, in 1952, by saying that he would expose him to the Greek people for not taking the Cyprus issue to the United Nations. Venizelos’ reply was strict and he pointed out that he would never let any one intervene into the foreign policy of Greece. In 1953 Makarios was still hopeful that the U.N. would extend self-determination to Cyprus and for that reason he rejected Grivas’ suggestion of an armed rebellion. Following these affairs, up to 1954, the Greek Government rejected Archbishop Makarios’ suggestions that Greece should raise the Cyprus question at the United Nations Assembly. Yet, since Greek public opinion strongly supported Enosis in 1954, it became inevitable. Greece’ attempts to that effect failed in U.N. At the United Nations in 1954, United States, stood on behalf of Britain, because she wanted to “prevent the Cyprus issue from destabilizing NATO’s southeastern flank. U.S. policymakers believed that the best way to achieve that goal was through bilateral and, after Turkey’s involvement, trilateral negotiations” (Bölükbaşı 27). For the United States, Cyprus was still under Britain’s sphere of influence and therefore, in order not to weaken the southern flank of NATO, America neither objected to Enosis nor supported “taksim” (Partition). Through the end of 1954, Makarios changed his plans to solve the unification problem of Cyprus. This time he sided with the armed rebellion and sustained the struggle of EOKA (National Organization for the Cyprus Struggle). In 1955 EOKA bulletins informed Greek Cypriots that the holy fight for union with Greece had begun. Those, who opposed it would be treated as traitors and would be killed. Such was the case that the suppressed desire for uniting with Greece reerupted again. Bombs exploded at British army and police stations indicating the beginning of a guerrilla war which was to continue for four years. Greek Cypriots fought under the leadership of George Grivas, however their goal of Enosis remained unmet and unresolved. In 1957 and 1958 Greece adopted again peaceful methods and appealed to the U.N. However as in the previous attempts, “the members of the Commonwealth, NATO and the Baghdad Pact sided with Britain and Turkey, whereas the Soviet Bloc and most Arab States supported Greece’s appeals” (Bölükbaşı 31). As Denktash has pointed out in his book called The Cyprus Triangle after that period, things became worse. The following years, until the end of 1958, were marked by intercommunal and inter-Greek violence which, by the summer of 1958, had assumed all the characteristics of a civil war (23). D. TURKISH POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS, 1950-1959. In the 1950s Turkey’s Cyprus policy developed as a reaction to Greek and Greek Cypriot reactions. During the early 1950s Turkish policymakers refused to accept that there was a Cyprus question as such. As I have mentioned above they were satisfied with the British sovereignty because it prevented the Soviet expansionism. Turkish leaders most of the time emphasized that they did not see any reason for a change in the status quo of Cyprus. However they were expecting other nations and Britain to respect the rights of Turkey in Cyprus. We can at that point conclude that during the beginning of 1950s Turkey did not determined a Cyprus policy. Due to this fact the Turkish governments were willing to compromise in Cyprus. On the other hand during these years Turkish leaders were trying to better their relations with Greek leaders, through the Balkan Pact. They were “anxious to coordinate Turkey’s Cyprus policy with Britain and the U.S. and to compromise on its stated objectives” (Bölükbaşı 37). The Soviet Union was continuing to be a threat for the Turks and Turkey did not want to have different opinions than her NATO allies. In 1955 when EOKA started its armed struggle, Turkish Cypriot community became politically active and they established TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization). As a result of EOKA attacks Turkish government felt the necessity to change its previous Cyprus policy. Although Turkish leaders insisted on the idea that Cyprus was an internal affair of Britain, after 1955 attacks of EOKA, they began to talk about reverting the island to Turkey. The changed policy of Turkey was significant in the words of Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu, at the London Conference in 1955. Cyprus should be in the hands of either Turkey or a Middle Eastern country allied to Turkey. This means that if Turkey enters a war, Cyprus should be on its side, Otherwise, the defense and supply of Turkey’s southern coast cannot be realized (Bilge 357). The London Conference, as both sides rejected Britain’s offer of self-government, ended in failure. However the London Conference was not the only gathering at which Greece and Turkey had different points of view: The problems continued in the Radcliffe Proposal in 1956, The Foot Plan in 1957 and the Macmillan Plan in 1958. Although Menderes never really believed in ruling the whole Cyprus again, as a reaction to Greece’s Enosis demands, called for the return of the island to Turkey. Therefore in the Menderes decade Turkish policy on Cyprus emphasized the British sovereignty over the island, and as an alternative focused on the partition thesis. Cyprus in those years was not regarded as the sole and ultimate problem of Turkey. Turkey was still considering the Soviet Union as the “most important national security threat” (Bölükbaşı 31). II. THE DECISIVE YEARS FOR THE CYPRUS PROBLEM In this chapter, the events that took place between the years 1959-1974 will be evaluated. The aim of the concentration on this period, is to emphasize the importance of these years in understanding the conflict of Cyprus. If Cyprus issue remains as a long-standing problem today, and if the two communities, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, still do not speak the same language, then one should go back to the beginning of the conflict and reconsider its origins.. The conflict started in the 1950s, but the most important period, which covers the initiation stage of the conflict as I stated above is the one between 1959-1974. For centuries the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots had lived together in mixed villages or separate villages which were close to one another. In those days “intercommunal relations were harmonious...., intermarriage was rare, but interethnic violence was even rarer” (Solsten xxv). However, during the twentieth century, the idea of Enosis and becoming literate, that is reading and interpreting over the cruelties of the other nation, separated the two communities. Due to these events, intercommunal violence occurred and it increased in the late 1950s. At the very beginning of the problem a fatal mistake had been done. In the end of the 1950s, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece and England agreed on some treaties that answered their own needs. The desires and expectations of the two communities were not taken into consideration. The representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities had to sign the treaties with little enthusiasm. They did not have the chance to talk for themselves, instead Britain, Turkey and Greece did the job. As a result of this event tensions and suspicions were heightened. This reluctant situation prepared a basis for unwarranted and brutal events in 1963, 1964, 1967 and 1974. For that reason if one wants to deal with the Cyprus dispute s/he should examine the gradual deteoriation of the situation. A. 1959-1960
Greek leaders, on the other hand, in 1959, had no hope of achieving Enosis through bringing the problem to the U.N. Also there was the possibility of the enactment of partition thesis of the Turks. Due to these facts Greeks, “began to consider independence an acceptable first stage solution of the Cyprus crisis” (Bölükbaþý 32). The only remaining solution seemed to be “independence”. Turkish administration was calling for compromise and was rejecting the Enosis plans of Greeks. So when Greece wanted to have negotiations, Turks immediately accepted the offer. After Zorlu and Averoff’s meeting in Paris, Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers met in Zurich in 5-11 February 1959 and agreed on a formula for settling the Cyprus problem. On 19 February, following a conference in London, attended by the representatives of Britain, Turkey, Greece, and the two Cypriot communities, an agreement was signed for the final settlement of the Cyprus dispute. With the abandonment of British rule the two communities came face to face, however they were not yet ready. (Hart 6). The Zurich and London agreements prohibited Enosis and the two national communities became co-founder partners. Also during those agreements, basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus was drafted. According to this draft the State of Cyprus was going to be a Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President being Turkish. Also the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President was granted a veto right. The Zurich-London Settlement was welcomed both in Turkey and in Menderes administration, as it was not against the national interests of Turks. The Turks were convinced that from now on Cyprus was not going to unite with Greece. Another important thing during the 1959 agreements was the attitude of British leaders towards the Turkish Cypriots: They and Turkish representatives never accepted to define Turkish Cypriots as a “minority”. Instead they were recognized as one of the two communities in the island. On the other hand in 1959 settlement, Britain maintained sovereignty over two bases in Cyprus. (99 square miles). “The borders of these bases were subsequently negotiated between the British Government and the representatives of the two Cypriot communities, and an agreement was reached on 1 July 1960” (Bölükbaþý 35). According to the web pages written by the Greek Americans the Zurich and London agreements were imposed on the people of Cyprus and the real reason of their signing them was because “the sole alternative would have been the continued denial of independence and freedom, continued bloodshed and, possibly the forced partition of Cyprus” (Hellenic Resources Institute). 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS: 1960 CONSTITUTION. British colonial administration continued until 16 August 1960 when as a joint bicommunal state, the Republic of Cyprus was founded. According to the constitution the government divided into executive, legislative and judicial branches. The President had to be a Greek Cypriot elected by the Greek Cypriots, and the Vice-President a Turkish Cypriot elected by the Turkish Cypriots, both for a period of five years. Turkish Cypriot Vice-President had the right to veto like the members of the House of Representatives. Greek and Turkish were chosen as the two official languages and both communities had the right to celebrate Greek and Turkish national holidays. The constitution required that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots be represented in the civil service at the ratio of 70 to 30 percent and civil disputes like religious matters and personal status were to be tried in communal courts. The highest judicial organs, the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice, had to be presided over by neutral presidents. Besides these separate municipalities were conceived for Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the five largest towns of the island. The establishment of the municipalities became one of the most controversial issue between the two communities, because Greek Cypriots thought that such laws could lead to partition whereas Turkish Cypriots thought that through them Greek Cypriots could weaken their separate communal identity. The three treaties-the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment- were settled between Turkey, Greece, and Britain and were added to the Constitution in London. However they went into effect on August 16, 1960. 3. TREATY OF GUARANTEE. Having the Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part, the treaty of Guarantee, provided that Greece, Turkey and Britain would ensure the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus as regulated by the Basic Articles of its constitution. The Treaty also banned the participation of the Republic of Cyprus, in whole or in part, with any political or economic union. (Article I). Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom were set about to repress any activity aiming at the partition or the union of the island with any other nation. (Article II). The Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey were to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty. (Article III). If the “state of affairs” was endangered or changed, then each of the three guaranteeing Powers had the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the position created by the present treaty. If joint actions were not possible then these states had the right to act independently. (Article IV). 4. TREATY OF ALLIANCE. This treaty engaged the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in their common desire to uphold peace and to preserve the security of each of them. The parties accepted to co-operate for their common defense and to resist any attack directed to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. (Articles I and II). In order to achieve this, a Tripartite Headquarters was going to be established on the territory of the Cyprus and Greece and Turkey were going to participate in it. (Article III and IV). Greece and Turkey were permitted to deploy 950 and 650 military personnel to Cyprus to protect the island and train its army. (Additional Protocol No.1). The command of the Tripartite Headquarters were going to be assumed in rotation. (Article V). 5. TREATY OF ESTABLISHMENT The Treaty of Establishment, has the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey on one part and the Republic of Cyprus on the other part. The Republic of Cyprus was going to include the island of Cyprus together with the islands lying off its coast except the two areas, which should remain under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. (Article 1). The Republic of Cyprus was going to co-operate fully with the United Kingdom to ensure the security and effective operation of the military bases situated in the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, and the full enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights conferred by this Treaty. (Article 2). The Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom were going to co-operate in the common defense of Cyprus and the agreements concerning the status of forces in the island should be enacted as it is determined in the Treaty.(Article 3 and 4). According to that Treaty the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom accepted to carry out the necessary financial and administrative arrangements to settle questions arising out of the termination of British administration in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. They also undertook to carry out the arrangements concerning trade, commerce and other matters. B. 1960-1963. 1. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE CURRENT SITUATION OF THE ISLAND When the Republic of Cyprus came into being on August 16, 1960, the Menderes administration in Turkey was already overthrown by a military junta. This coup and the events followed, affected Turkey’s Cyprus policy in a very negative way. Because they had problems at home, Turks maintained an optimistic point of view. They tried to ignore the fact that one day Greeks and Greek Cypriots might try other ways to achieve Enosis. So the Turkish leaders welcomed the new settlement and the declaration of Cyprus’ independence. As mentioned above the Treaties were not contrary to the expectations of Turkey. Also the treaties enabled Turks to gain back some of the rights they had lost in 1878. So such treaties were considered as success and they directed the Turkish Republic to have a complacent behavior. Greeks on the other hand saw 1959-1960 Treaties as a step towards the Enosis. Greek leaders never considered the settlement as a final status for the island but as a stage. For the Turkish Cypriots Zurich and London agreements, although put aside the partition thesis, were good, because they put an end to Enosis plans. On the other hand Greek Cypriots were dissatisfied, because in contrast to their population Turkish-Cypriots were raised to “virtual political equality and grossly over-represented in the institutions of state” (Dodd) Especially EOKA members were disappointed because Enosis had not been attained. After the Zurich-London agreements Makarios did not like the proposed settlement. Before agreeing to it, he personally consulted with Greek Cypriots, however he was advised to accept it by the Greece Government. He “returned home believing that he had achieved the first stage of Enosis struggle” (Bölükbaþý 49-50). On July 31, 1960, Glafkos Clerides was elected President of the House of Representatives and Rauf Denktash was elected the President of the Turkish Communal Chamber. The constitution became effective on the day Cyprus became a republic. One month later the new republic was admitted to the membership in the Commonwealth and in December 1961, Cyprus became a member of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank. However as later Makarios would emphasize on 8 November 1966, the eternal desire of Greek Cypriots was to unite with motherland Greece and their only and invariable aim was Enosis. They desired to unite Cyprus as a whole with the national body. According to their way of thinking they had taken over Cyprus as an undivided Greek island, they had preserved it as such and now they should have delivered it to the mother’s bosom. 2. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES & MAKARIOS’ PROPOSALS When one looks back to those years today, it is apparent that such a Republic can not live long. However it was clear from the beginning that Makarios had neither intended to go on with a bi-national state nor support it. It became clear very soon after the independence that the Greek Cypriots did not intend to live by the Constitution. Although with the establishment of the Constitution, the independence and sovereignty of the island was transferred to an equal partnership between the two communities, many controversies occurred just after the founding of the Republic. Independence did not guarantee the reconciliation. Several problems occurred in the interpretation and working of the Constitution. As mentioned before, both communities were already not satisfied with the enactment of the constitution and one side was also looking for a trouble. Problems which occurred only contributed to the distrust between the two parties. According to the Constitution the army of the Republic was going to have two thousand men; 60 percent Greeks, 40 percent Turks. “One major point of contention concerned the composition of units under the six-to-four ratio decreed for the Cypriot army” (Solsten 34). However the formation of the army, that is whether it will be separate or mixed was not mentioned. Whereas Makarios wanted complete integration, Fazýl Küçük favored segregated companies by saying that “religious, linguistic and disciplinary problems could be unmanageable in the mixed army” (Bölükbaþý 51). Events expanded and Turkish Vice-President used his constitutional veto power to “halt the development of an integrated force” (34). Then the development of the national army ceased. Other problems arose in the application of the seven-to three ratio of employment in government agencies. Counteraction developed in 1962 regarding the status of municipalities. They accused each other of violating the Constitution and they wanted the Supreme Constitutional Court to rule on them and the taxes gathered. The Greek Cypriots wanted to end the separate Turkish Cypriot municipal councils permitted by the British Government in 1958, and recognized in 1959 Colonial Administration. For them these municipalities were the first stage on the way to the partition they feared. So by 1962, Makarios, who was against separate municipalities, proposed unification of them and Turks representation in proportion to their population in each town. Underneath those frictions, were the Greek Cypriots’ belief that the Turkish side had excessive constitutional powers. Turkish Cypriots were given status of a partner during the settlement, and Greek community did not like the idea of sharing the power with a “minority”. One should remember the fact that seeing Turks as a minority was a part of Greek Cypriot policy. They were looking for a trouble and the Turks insisting on the 70:30 ratio principle in the civil service, gave them a chance. On the other hand Turks did not want any revision on the Constitution. During these events the Turkish Republic forced and warned Makarios to obey the Constitution and showed their determined attitude that they would not let anyone change the rights of Turkish Cypriots given by the 1959 agreements. In Makarios’ visit to Ankara on the 22nd of November, Inönü told him that “Turkey would not allow him to alter the constitution” (Bölükbaþý 53). In November 1963 President Makarios proposed 13 amendments to the Constitution, containing Greek revision demands of previous years. The proposals, although had some items looking like favoring Turkish Cypriots, completely served the needs of Greek Cypriots. According to the Constitution only Greek President of the House of Representatives could deputize for the president, but Makarios proposed for also the Turkish Vice-President’s. Other things Makarios proposed were to remove the veto powers of the President and the Vice-President, to unify the municipalities, to reduce the Turkish Cypriot component in the civil and military arms of government. Other features of the proposals were to have the Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President elected by the Greek Cypriot dominated House of Representatives as a whole (not by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members separately), and to abolish the separate community voting on fiscal, electoral and some other matters. 3. BREAKDOWN OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER The accepting of those proposals meant loosing the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the Turkish Cypriots. So Turkish Republic and the Turkish Cypriots, who “smelled Enosis in the air” rejected the idea. In fact Turkey rejected this without even referring the matter to Fazýl Küçük. Also the timing of Makarios, in offering proposals, was perfect because during this time Turkish Government was threatened by severe cabinet crisis and proposal past with minimum notice. On the island however, “it aroused a storm as Turkish Cypriots sensed a grave threat to their existence” (Harris 106). Another reason of Turks’ immediate opposition was Makarios’ speeches, in which he proved to be a pro-Enosis leader. 4. AMERICA’S RESPONSE With the emergence of the Cyprus crisis in the late 1950s, U.S avoided direct involvement in the problem because Britain was on stage. During 1962 and 1963 U.S Administration did not want Cyprus to be a problem between its NATO allies. Also neither Greece nor Turkey “wanted to endanger the integrity of the southeast wing of the NATO, which ensured them strategic support against the Warsaw Pact” (Hart 3). The island became a determining factor between the United States and Turkey in the 1960s. Before that the two nations did not have a disagreement about Cyprus. Paul B. Henze in his book Turkish Democracy and the American Alliance mentioned about Cyprus as an attractive but troublesome island and said that U.S. had no basic interests on the island, except the fact that it caused friction between the two of its important allies, Turkey and Greece. Another concern of America in the beginning of 1960s was Makarios’ cooperation with the communist AKEL party. During Makarios’ visit to America, U.S. leaders urged him to establish his own party. When controversies occurred in the enactment of the Cyprus Constitution, U.S. gave its constitutional amendments as an example and sided with the Greek Cypriots, who wanted to make adjustments. In December 1961, Secretary of State Dean Rusk told Kyprianou, Cyprus Foreign Minister, that “the U.S. constitution would have been unworkable too, without continual adjustment and interpretation to meet changing needs” (Bölükbaþý 54). However after the upheaval of the events following municipality disputes, U.S. administration, was again reluctant to interfere and left the solution of the problem to Britain. 5. 1963 CRISIS Under these circumstances, the discrepancy between the two communities blew up at the end of 1963. The Greek Cypriot side, on the basis of a well prepared plan called the Akritas plan, attacked the Turkish Cypriots. According to some scholars Makarios’ proposal was also a part of this plan. Both sides, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, undertook the 1963 crisis in a different way and accused the other of being guilty. According to the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots tried to demonstrate to the whole world that Cyprus had a unitary nature and there was no need for the treaties of guarantee. On the other hand Greek Cypriots had a different story to tell and they started telling it by saying that in December 1963, there was a threatening reaction from the Turkish Government, provoked by the T.M.T (Turkish Terrorist Organization according to them). Greek Cypriots also argued that Turks had used President’s proposals for amending the Constitution as an excuse for putting into effect their long prepared plan for the partition of Cyprus. Their withdrawing from the Government was an outcome of this. The Greek Cypriot context, completely ignored the blame that they were about to annihilate the Cypriot minority. They also accused Turks by saying that “the underlying reason for obstructing the Constitution was to further Ankara’s partitionist plans. (Hellenistic http://www.hri.org/Cyprus/Cyprus-Problem/ p-partition.html). Also Greek Cypriots charged T.M.T. with causing the first inter-communal violence. This, according to them, was the result of a policy of hate cultivated by the Turkish Cypriot leaders, with the aim of persuading world public opinion that Turkish Cypriots could not co-exist with Greek Cypriots and, therefore, partition in one form or another was necessary. Also T.M.T. terrorists were found in possession of vast quantities of arms. (Hellenistic http://www.hri.org/Cyprus/Cyprus-Problem/p-TMT.html) However up to the incident, apparently planned by Makarios, Cyprus was peaceful as the U.S. ambassador in Cyprus, Fraser Wilkins pointed out. Two unarmed Turkish Cypriot peasants, returning home from working in the fields, were approached by Greek Cypriot security guards, armed and uniformed, who demanded to see their passes. The peasants carried no documentation, and, in the ensuing altercation, they were killed (Hart 10). In order to restore peace in the island the British deployed their forces from their sovereign base areas, but this did not help. In 1963, Makarios knew that Enosis was not possible in a very short period of time. There existed some problems. These problems were the possibility of a Turkish military intervention, the possibility of Greece’s not siding with Greek Cypriots, and the possibility of United States’ and NATO’s supporting Turkey in its intervention. Therefore, Makarios started intercommunual violence. Bölükbaþý, in his book claims that after the Turkish refusal to accept the constitutional amendments, Makarios ordered these attacks in order to achieve the changes by force. C. 1964-1974. 1. "64" VIOLENCE. After, Greek Cypriots killed five more Turks on 24 December, 1963, Ýnönü realized the vitality of the threat that Turkish Cypriots were exposed to. Turkey, Greece and Britain issued a cease-fire call and Turkish Government mentioned about the possibility of a joint military intervention. Because Greek and British leaders did not side with Turkey to arrange a joint military intervention, on 25 December 1963, “low-altitude warning flights” over Cyprus took place. During these times “the Turkish armed forces were neither trained nor positioned to undertake a landing on Cyprus” (Harris, Troubled Alliance 107). From this fact one can realize that, in that period, Turkey was not making plans of Partition as Greek Cypriots insisted. Otherwise they would have been ready to intervene when the time came. The only feasible military option then open to the Turkey was to make limited air strikes. On the other hand Inönü’s decision not to intervene was also in accordance with America’s wishes although they did not want to play a prominent role in solving the Cyprus conflict. U.S was still reluctant to get involved in the Cyprus Problem. On January 16, 1964, British Government convened a conference in London with the participation of Turkish, Greek and Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives, to deal with the problem. They discussed the political status of the island and three different plans proposed. Whereas Greek Cypriots demanded the establishment of a unitary state and the elimination of special rights granted to Turkish Cypriots by the 1959 Agreements, Turkish Cypriots demanded a revision in those treaties. The Turks aimed at such a revision that would give them a chance to establish bizonal or contonal federation. They saw partition as the sole alternative if a federation was not accepted. As expected, both sides rejected each other’s demands and the plan of a British side favoring both communities did not satisfy them. (Bölükbaþý 62-3) Greeks insisted that during the entire period the threat of a Turkish invasion was constant and Turkish military aircraft flew over Cyprus and Turkish war equipment and trained officers landed on the island. They also blamed Turks of killing and injuring about 100 Greek Cypriots, mainly civilians. They argued that as a result of these they had to take the matter before the United Nations. (Hellenistic http://www.hri.org/Cyprus/Cyprus-Problem/ p-london.html) After the continuance of violence,
However the establishment of a joint peace keeping force did not end the violence and illegal troops entered the island. In spring, the legislation was on the hands of Greek Cypriots, because Turkish Cypriot representatives like their counterparts in the civil service, feared for their safety and did not participate. (Solsten 170). In June the National Guard was formed by the Greek Cypriot government against a Turkish attack. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, organized militarily under TMT. In August Grivas attacked the Turkish Cypriot area of Erenköy. Severe intercommunal fighting occurred in March and April 1964. As a result of these attacks, a substantial portion of the island’s Turkish Cypriot population was pushed into the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. Slum conditions occurred due to overcrowding. “Many Turkish Cypriots who had not moved into Nicosia gave up their land and houses for the security of other enclaves” (Solsten 36). They felt that their lives would be in danger if they entered the Greek areas of the island and they fled from their homes, taking with them only what they could carry. As Denktaþ stated Turkish community was forced into an economic and administrative vacuum. “Existence in a vacuum is impossible and the Turkish Cypriots therefore mustered all their available potential and organized themselves within the limits of the 1960 Constitution” (Denktaþ, Cyprus Triangle 34). However “Turkish Cypriots’ main loss was in the economic sector; as a result of intercommunal violence, 4000 Turks lost their jobs in the public and Greek private sectors” (Bölükbaþý 70). 2. AMERICA’S ATTITUDE & THE JOHNSON LETTER. During London Conference America realized that things were getting out of control, however it still opposed assuming an active role in solving the Cyprus crisis because U.S. leaders thought that they had heavy commitments in many parts of the world. Also United States did not have any strategic interest in Cyprus. However the continuation of violence on the island and Ankara’s continuing intervention threats, brought the U.S. to modify its policy towards Cyprus. During the 1963 crisis United States declared that it was “not a party to this issue”, but in the middle of 1964 it assumed the role of a mediator between Greece and Turkey. At the beginning America aimed at not taking sides in the dispute and was determined to stand for peace and compromise, without accepting fully the arguments of their party. However such an attitude did not please both countries. (Harris, Troubled Alliance 110) After Makarios’s rejection of the NATO force on 4 February 1964, United States sent George Ball to Cyprus to convince Makarios that “some kind of a peacekeeping force was necessary in Cyprus to prevent Turkey’s intervention” and to convince Inönü that the U.S. was doing its best to end the crisis. However Ball’s plan did not work, because Makarios rejected the U.S. plan. During May, things in Cyprus deteriorated and Inönü decided to intervene. U.N. peacekeeping force had proven useless and every minute people were getting killed. Inönü informed U.S. ambassador Raymond Hare about his decision and Hare asked for one day to consult the U.S. administration. One may get suspicious of Inönü’s accepting Hare’s offer because as mentioned above Turkey did not have an organization to intervene in the island. Inönü, who was remembered as a genius in diplomacy, knew from the very beginning that America would not let Turkey intervene in Cyprus, and he also thought of Soviet support of Greek Cypriots. American leaders were so concerned, at that time, that a Turkish move against Cyprus, would lead to a war between Turkey and Greece. So Johnson’s letter came to Inönü on 5 June 1964. As Paul B. Henze stated in his book, Khrushev threatened retaliation if Washington let Turkey intervene in Cyprus and prepared a trap. Lyndon Johnson leaped into it in June by sending a warning letter to Ýnönü. According to Henze during these years both countries, Greece and Turkey were bluffing in order to gain greater American backing. (14-15) “The Johnson letter forgotten in the United States is still a live memory in Turkey” (Henze 14). Johnson letter reminded the Turkish republic in a rather undiplomatic and blunt style, that Turkey should think twice before intervening in Cyprus. Harris in his book Troubled Alliance confesses that a more conciliatory and less categorical approach probably would have accomplished Johnson’s aim without abrading Turkish feelings so severely and that delivery of a formal written communication was unnecessary under the circumstances. (115) Johnson in the very beginning of the letter reminded Ýnönü that he should consult with the United States before any such action is taken and added that an intervention of Cyprus might result in the partition of the island and this solution was excluded by the treaty of Guarantee. Furthermore, Johnson maintained that an intervention in Cyprus could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union and if Turkey takes a step without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies, Turkey might be left alone. Johnson also stated that the United Nations would react in the strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey, which would defy the efforts of the United Nations. Another important aspect of the letter was the part calling attention to the bilateral agreement between Turkey and United States in the field of military assistance. The fourth article of the agreement of July 1947, had forbidden “the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished”. If one sums up, Johnson warned Ýnönü that a Greek-Turkish war could occur, that Turkey’s intervention might lead to a Soviet attack on Turkey and U.S. might refrain from coming to its aid, that United Nations would react strongly and that Turkey could not use American supplied military equipment. The letter created a sharp divide in the Turkish-American relationship and after that Turkish-American relations would never be the same. Inönü wrote a reply on 13 June 1964, although Johnson’s letter pointed out most of the things he feared. In his letter he started by commending both on the wording and content of Johnson’s letter and went on with the legitimate right of Turkey, given by the Treaty of Guarantee, to stop the violation. Then he criticized the main principles of NATO and said that if NATO’ structure was so weak as to give credit to the aggressor’s allegations, then it meant that this defect of NATO needed to be remedied. However Inönü did not mention about the military assistance agreement, because he himself knew that U.S could not agree the use of any United States military equipment for purposes other than those pointed out in the agreement. 3. TURKEY RECONSIDERS ITS FOREIGN POLICY. Johnson’s letter opened a new page in the evolution of Turkish-American relations. When it became public, a strong reaction occurred. Johnson in order to form a balance between the two countries, made several attempts to influence Greek officials, not to tempt Turkish people and appointed Secretary of State Dean Acheson as a mediator. Acheson started “mediation” on 11 July 1964 in Geneva and offered the union of Cyprus with Greece and some modifications favoring the position of Turks in the island. While the negotiations were continuing Greek Cypriots made attempts to control the island. In the beginning of August the National Guard carried out a coordinated sea and land assault against Erenköy (Kokkina) on the northwest coast in an effort to cut off the major Turkish Cypriot supply line to Turkey. (Solsten 217). Turkish Government due to this attack favored an aerial bombing and the attack took place on the 8 August. Meanwhile Inönü warned Makarios that the bombing would continue until the withdrawal of Greek forces to the pre-6 August 1964 positions. On 10 August Ýnönü’s proposal to cease bombing met with disapproval from all commanders and several ministers. However he feared that events might develop in an unexpected way and there was still the possibility of Soviet Union’s intervention. So he ignored all objections and ordered a cessation of aircraft attacks. (Bölükbaþý 84) The second Acheson plan continued after Greek and Turkish representatives returned to Geneva on 15 August 1964 and Acheson made an attempt to reconcile the Turkish and Greek positions. Turkey insisted on having full sovereignty over the Karpas peninsula but the compromise plan offered a smaller base to be leased to Turkey for 50 years. (Bölükbaþý 86) According to Ýnönü, Turkey was unsuccessful in solving the Cyprus problem in 1964 because of “the regional and international conditions that were unfavorable to Turkey.” Soviet Union was ready to defend the freedom and independence of the Republic of Cyprus against a foreign invasion. During those times, Turkish public accused the American Government of not supporting Turkey when it wanted. Turks condemned U.S. for being “false friends” and blamed them of betraying Turks over Cyprus. Daily demonstrations took place in front of the American Embassy in Ankara and for the first time, crowds of thousands chanted “Yankee Go Home” and threw stones at the building. (Harris 118) Furthermore to make matters worse “distorted and tendentious versions of the Johnson message leaked into the Turkish press almost immediately, generating profound popular reaction” (Harris, Troubled Alliance 115). The Turkish press criticized the U.S. embassy for misleading Washington and not reporting properly Turkey’s needs in Cyprus. An opinion occurred that Turkey should not depend on America to protect its rights and NATO alliance was an instrument to protect U.S. interests. Also it was commonly assumed by the Turks that “United States was at heart in the Greek camp....and that Washington would stop at nothing in opposing Turkish desires” (Harris, Troubled Alliance 120). United States, in order to mitigate the fears provoked by the Johnson letter, assured the Turkish Government that United States would come to the help of Turkey in case of an attack from U.S.S.R., while using its treaty rights in Cyprus. (Milliyet, Sep. 24, 1964) Towards the end of 1964 United States Administration decided to delay its reconciliatary role. The 1964 crisis in Cyprus effected Turkish-American relations and the failure of the Acheson mission contributed to this. However, during the fall of 1964, armed clashes between the communities weakened. The lowering of the tension in the island is interpreted by Harris in his book Troubled Alliance as the settling down of Turkish and Greek communities to their own “cold war” confrontation. (121). During 1964 Greek American associations, Greek Americans and Greek Orthodox Church worked hard in order to impress American leaders to establish a “Greek-dominated unitary state in Cyprus” (Bölükbaþý 90). However when compared to Greek lobbying in 1974, this one was less effective. Especially after the air strikes in August they tried to influence the Congress and the President. After 1964 Cyprus crisis and the Johnson letter, Turkey began to reconsider its foreign policy in order to evaluate the reasons for Turkey’s failure to intervene. Some of the leaders agreed on the fact that they had neglected relations with the other nations, in order to be a close ally of U.S. So Turkish administration decided to establish good relations with Turkey’s neighbors especially with the Soviet Union and to intensify their relations with the Third World countries. However Turkey’s relations with the Third World had never been consistent and due to this fact, only a few of these countries chose to side with Turkey. Many of them were multinational and it was impossible for them to accept the existence of a “minority”. Therefore it was not a surprise to see most of them voting in favor of pro-Makarios resolutions at the United Nations. (Bölükbaþý 121) Beginning with the Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin’s visit to Moscow, Turkey adopted a “multi-faceted” foreign policy and Soviets tried to better Soviet-Turkish relations. Soviets apologized for Stalin’s post-World-War II claims on Turkey and promised not to sell heavy arms to Makarios. Therefore the post-1964 Cyprus policy of the Soviets resembled a juggling act in which the Soviets did not want to offend any of the parties. (Bölükbaþý 118). When Süleyman Demirel, the head of Justice Party, came to power in November 1964. He continued the Multi-faceted foreign policy. Although in the beginning he looked on the Cyprus problem as annoying but secondary, later he realized that Turkey should look for new friends in order to have their support for Turkey’s Cyprus policy. He also believed that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a Greek-Turkish war and he wanted to solve problems through bilateral negotiations with Greece. (Bölükbaþý 130) By the 1965, United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) were dealing with the problem in the Island and Makarios had the belief that since the United States had stopped a Turkish invasion in 1964, Turkey would never be permitted to intervene by force. (Hart 22). By 1966, Turkish Government became convinced that bilateral talks with the Greek government in Athens were the best way to advance matters. (Hart 18) Between the years 1965 and 1967, Turkish-American relations were tense because Johnson’s letter was published by media in 1966 and its significance was well understood. During this period those who considered the U. S as Turkey’s best friend decreased in number. 4. 1967 CRISIS AND U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS. The following days proved that, Greek Cypriots had “no intention of going back to pre-december 1963 order in Cyprus. Demirel’s intention to solve the Cyprus dispute through bilateral talks with Greeks, resulted in Demirel-Kollias summit on 9 and 10 September 1967. Nothing came out of the talks because Greek Prime Minister demanded unconditional Enosis and rejected the sovereign base demand of Turkish Prime Minister. During this period, there was a tense relationship between Makarios and the military government that was installed in Greece after coup d’etat in 1967. Makarios wanted the support of Greek Cypriots to establish an independent and nonaligned Cyprus. In November 1967, fighting had again broken out in the island. Units of the National Guard and the Greek Cypriot police participated in the attack to two Turkish villages. “The operation was ferocious in its intensity and effect” (Denktash, Cyprus Triangle 50). Twenty-eight Turks were murdered in a few hours and Turkey and Greece were thus brought to the brink of war again. President Johnson sent Vance to find an immediate settlement of the renewed crisis. Although the possibility of a war between Turkey and Greece was so remote according to U.S, they felt the need of finding a peaceful negotiation. In this period the U.S. administration concentrated its capabilities on the prevention of war. In 1967 different from 1964 America “not only urged restraint on Turkey, but also effectively influenced Greece to compromise” (Bölükbaþý 152). However, still Vance’s arrival in Ankara was taken as an another attempt of America to prevent Turkey’s intervention. The crisis was defused when United States mediation brought an agreement that endured for the next seven years. “All foreign troops in excess of those permitted by the Treaty of Alliance were to be removed from Cyprus, and the National Guard was to be dismantled in exchange for an immediate Turkish demobilization” (Solsten 217). However as it was later discovered that several thousand mainland Greek troops and officers were continued to be attached to the Greek Cypriot National Guard. (Denktash, Cyprus Triangle 51) There were a lot of differences in the Cyprus crises in 1964 and 1967 except the Greek Cypriots’ violence and oppression towards Turkish Cypriots: First of all in 1964 there was a Soviet opposition to a Turkish military intervention, but in 1967 Soviet leaders avoided criticizing Turkey’s preparations for a landing. Also in 1964 U.S. president sent a notorious letter to the Turkish Prime Minister, however in 1967, United States sent mediator Vance; There were reports that told Demirel that Turkey could not use American supplied weapons in Cyprus but these reports provoked little reaction from the public. Turks accused the U.S. administration as being pro-Greek in 1964 but they did not say anything in 1967; Due to this fact U.S. did not support Turkey in 1964 but sided with Demirel’s handling of the crisis in 1967; In 1964 Turkey felt herself internationally isolated but this mitigated in 1967. Also the Greek lobbying, which was very active in 1964, proved to be inactive in 1967. (Bölükbaþý 142-3) Besides these different approaches, Turkey was trapped unprepared in both crises and its armed forces lacked readiness to undertake a landing operation on Cyprus. After 1967 crisis, Turkish Cypriots organized in a better way in order to eliminate the bad conditions. For them the only realistic solution was “federation of two autonomous communal administrations” (Bulletin of the Foreign Ministry 43). Also Makarios abandoned the policy of blockading the Turkish Cypriots and many people thought that normalcy was coming back to Cyprus. Although between the years 1964 to 1967, he never accepted to talk with Turkish Cypriots unless they agreed to discuss minority rights within a Greek Cyprus, after that he changed this and intercommunal negotiations started. In Turkey everything was considered normal after the withdrawal of Greek troops from Cyprus in 1967. Difficulties at home first appeared in the form of anti-American and anti-NATO student riats in 1968. Cultivation of opium poppies in Turkey, affected Turkish-American relations between 1966 and 1974. Turkey was blamed by the U.S for its passive policy towards the issue. At that time in America there had been many drug-users and United States administration was determined to take precautions. So America’s pressures to ban the poppy cultivation increased anti-Americanism in Turkey. Prime Minister Nihat Erim banned it on June 30, 1971. The ban remained active until Ecevit revoked it on 1 July, 1974 by saying that “no independent nation could negotiate with another state on which plants to grow and not to grow” (Hürriyet 25 July 1975). In 1971 Turkey was dealing with the domestic terrorism and on 12 March 1971 the generals presented Demirel with a memorandum asking him to step aside and permit formation of an above-parties government that could take firm measures to maintain public order. So Demirel resigned. The next month martial law was declared. During 1971 and 1972 U.S. did not play an active role in Turkey’s dealing with terrorism. America’s aid and business activities, as well as educational and cultural relationships, had for the most part remained unaffected by terrorism. (Henze 21) In 1970s Turkey as Henze pointed out learned to live with a situation on the island. At that time Turkish Cypriots were living separately from Greek Cypriots and Makarios was enjoying his status and had no enthusiasm for joining Cyprus to Greece. (21). Ecevit, who came to power in January 1974 with Erbakan, shortly after a few months coming to terms, proved to be a risk taker. In contrast to Ýnönü’s cautionist and Demirel’ multi-faceted policies, he adopted an assertive policy. Ecevit’s policy of Cyprus was not to accept a unitary state. According to Ecevit, in those years American policy toward Cyprus was as follows: Cyprus should not remain independent as it could become a communist base; Partition could only worsen the situation; Turkey should not intervene because such an action might cause war between Turkey and Greece and this would weaken NATO alliance; Cyprus should be united with Greece. (Bölükbaþý 179) This last item was again proved to be right when U.S. did not react during 1974 coup in Cyprus. 5. NICOS SAMPSON COUP & TURKEY’S INTERVENTION: DIVISION OF THE ISLAND. After 1967 intercommunual strife was overshadowed. During six years of continuing peace, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots led a political life of their own. Peace prevailed between the two communities until the coming back of Grivas to the island in 1971. During that period Greek Junta began to see Makarios as an obstacle to Enosis. Papadopoulos and others “reached the conclusion that Makarios would never settle the Cyprus problem, whether by Enosis, double Enosis, or essential compromises with Turkish Cypriots” (Hart 130). Furthermore, when in 1973, a new junta came to power, matters became worse. Even the sudden death of Grivas did not better the events. On 15 July 1974 a coup led by Nicos Sampson destroyed the Presidential Palace and overthrew Makarios. However they failed to kill Makarios, who has fled with British help. Sampson immediately told that the negotiations would continue but this was not convincing. He was planning to unite Cyprus with Greece if Turkey had not intervened. As Denktash pointed out in his book The Cyprus Triangle;
Turkish Government, on the other hand, demanded the dismissal of Sampson, removal of all Greek officers from the National Guard and a guarantee of the island’s independence. After being rejected, Ecevit flew to London to seek British participation in joint military operation, although he knew that he would be refused. Also in London he rejected to talk with Joseph J. Sisco, who was sent by Kissinger to start a negotiation process in order to delay Turkish intervention, by saying that U.S. was not a guarantor power. Indicating the Article 3 of the Treaty of Guarantee as the basis of its action, Turkey intervened on 20 July 1974. The coup was an attempt to extend Greek dictatorship to the island and Turkey’s sole aim was to save the lives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As a result of Turkey’s First Peace Operation, a civilian government came to power and Karamanlis became a president in Athens, the Sampson coup collapsed and Glafkos Clerides took the place of Makarios. Between 25 to 30 July 1974, foreign Ministers of Turkey, Greece, and Britain held talks and signed a joint peace declaration on Cyprus and spoke of “two autonomous administrations that of Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community” (METU http://w3.metu.edu.tr:8080/ncyprus/cyp6.html). In the second Geneva conferences on 9 August,1974, Turkey demanded for a federal solution to the problem after finding out that none of the agreed provisions of the first Geneva conference had been put into effect by the Greeks. Also it was obvious that the Greek and Greek Cypriot representatives were trying to gain time in Geneva in order to organize their groups. (Birand, 30 Hot Days 365) For that reason Clerides wanted thirty-six to forty-eight hours to consider the plans, but Turan Güneþ, the Turkish Foreign Minister, demanded an immediate response. Greeks regarded this as impossible and the next day the Turkish forces extended their control to some 36 per cent of the island, in order to rescue the Turkish Cypriots. Seventy-five days later Makarios came back to Cyprus and took over from Clerides without an election. It soon became clear that Makarios had not changed and he had started out an anti-Turkish propaganda in America which resulted in arms embargo of U.S. in February 1975. |
